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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION AND CUSTOMARY 
NORM ASSESSMENT OF NON-REFOULEMENT: THE 






This article considers whether the Commonwealth Government’s border protection policy of turning 
back asylum seeker boats breaches its international obligation not to refoule refugees, as imposed under 
the Refugee Convention art 33(1).  In addressing this issue the article examines whether art 33(1) applies 
extraterritorially, and whether a similar obligation has become embedded in customary international law.  
The conclusions reached are applied to specific situations where Australia has returned refugees.  
 
I     INTRODUCTION 
 
In September 2013, the Commonwealth Government implemented ‘Operation Sovereign 
Borders’, a border protection policy that seeks to prevent asylum seekers reaching Australia’s 
territory.1  The policy involves a joint multi-agency taskforce, Border Protection Command 
(‘BPC’),2 using naval vessels to intercept and turn back asylum seekers travelling by boat once 
they reach Australia’s contiguous zone.3  This typically involves BPC towing or escorting the 
boats back to other states.4  As of 28 January 2015, BPC had turned back 15 boats containing 
429 asylum seekers.5  In  one incident on 1 May 2014, BPC intercepted a boat carrying 18 
asylum seekers near Ashmore Reef (an Australian territory in the ocean west of Darwin)6 and 
escorted it back to Indonesia7 (after adding three more).8  In another incident in late June 2014, 
BPC intercepted a boat containing Sri Lankan asylum seekers of Sinhalese and Tamil 
ethnicities west of Cocos Islands and detained them, before transferring them to Sri Lankan 
authorities on 6 July.9  
This article examines whether such actions taken under Australia’s turn back policy breach 
Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under art 33(1) of the Convention Relating to the 
                                                 
* LLB Hons (University of Notre Dame Australia), Grad Dip of Psychology (UWA), BSc (UWA) 
1 See Liberal Party/National Party of Australia, The Coalition’s Operation Sovereign Borders Policy (July 2013) 
10 <http://www.nationals.org.au>. 
2 Australian Government, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Border Protection Command (10 
June 2014) <http://www.customs.gov.au/aboutus/protectingborders/bpc/default.asp>. 
3 See Liberal Party/National Party of Australia, The Coalition’s Policy for a Regional Deterrence Framework to 
Combat People Smuggling (August 2013) 15 http://www.nationals.org.au. 
4 See Natalie O'Brien, 'Boat Turnbacks May Breach International Law: UNHCR', The Sydney Morning 
Herald (online), 11 January 2014 http://www.smh.com.au. 
5 Peter Dutton, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, ‘Operation Sovereign Borders Delivers Six 
Months Without a Successful Smuggling Venture’ (Media Release, 28 January 2015) 
<http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/peterdutton/2015/Pages/Media-Releases.aspx>. 
6 Michael Bachelard, ‘Australian Navy Turns Back Asylum Seeker Boat to Indonesia After Loading Three Extra 
People’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 6 May 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au>. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.   
9 Scott Morrison, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, ‘Australian Government Returns Sri Lankan 
People Smuggling Venture’ (Media Release, 7 July 2014). 
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Status of Refugees 1951 (‘Refugee Convention’)10 and under customary international law 
(‘CIL’), which prohibit states from sending refugees to territories where there is a real risk they 
would face persecution on specific grounds.11  Of particular concern is the extent to which 
Australia’s obligations may differ extraterritorially, depending on whether a refugee is 
intercepted within the contiguous zone12 or on the high seas.13 
Part II examines Australia’s extraterritorial obligations under art 33(1).  Drawing on principles 
of treaty interpretation and decisions in both international and foreign courts, it is suggested 
and argued that obligations under art 33(1) apply whenever a refugee falls within a state’s 
jurisdiction, which would occur when a state, or its agents, exercise effective control or 
authority over a refugee.   Consequently, the non-refoulement obligation should not be limited 
territorially and should apply regardless of where a boat is intercepted.14  Moving beyond 
the Refugee Convention, Part III suggests and argues that sufficient evidence of state practice 
and opinio juris exist to embed the extraterritorial non-refoulement obligation under CIL.  A 
number of states which are not parties15 to the Refugee Convention or its Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees 1967 (‘Refugee Protocol’)16 will not be legally bound by the non-
refoulement obligation17 and refugees will therefore not be afforded art 33(1) protection in 
these states.  However, if art 33(1) has become a CIL rule, these non-States Parties will be 
bound by the non-refoulement obligation.18  Part IV applies the conclusions reached in Parts II 
and III to two incidents where the Commonwealth Government returned boats and suggests 
that Australia’s actions breached art 33(1) and its CIL equivalent.  Noting the challenges 
associated with the enforcement of Australia’s international obligations, Part V concludes by 
reflecting upon some concerns raised regarding the implications for Australia and those who 
may potentially have been refouled. 
 
II     EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF ART 33(1)  
 
Article 33(1) states: 
                                                 
10 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered 
into force 22 April 1954). 
11 Ibid; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Application No 43844/98 – T I v United Kingdom: 
Submissions to the European Court of Human Rights’ (2000) 12 International Journal of Refugee Law 268, 269; 
Tamara Wood and Jane McAdam, ‘Australian Asylum Policy all at Sea: An Analysis of Plaintiff M70/2011 v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and the Australia-Malaysia Arrangement’ (2012) 61 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 274, 293. 
12 The contiguous zone extends 12 nautical miles out from the perimeter of a state’s territorial sea. 
13 The high seas consist of all maritime zones not within 200 nautical miles of any state. 
14 ‘Interception’ in this situation refers to physical interceptions as opposed to administrative interceptions such 
as visa controls.  See, Barbara Miltner, ‘Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and 
Interception’ (2006) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 75, 83-4. 
15 For a list of States Parties to the treaties see United Nations, Participant States to the Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees; United Nations, Participant States to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
16 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into 
force 4 October 1967). 
17 Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: 
Opinion’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: 
UNHCR’s Global Consultation on International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 87, 140. 
18 Ibid. 




No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.19 
State and scholarly opinions as to whether art 33(1) applies extraterritorially have centred 
around the meaning of ‘return’.  The majority of scholars, including the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) in its Advisory Opinion (‘UNHCR’s 
Advisory Opinion’),20 contend that art 33(1) applies extraterritorially, thereby adopting a wide 
interpretation.  However, some states (including the Commonwealth Government)21 and state 
superior courts contend that art 33(1) only applies to a refugee within a state’s territory, thereby 
adopting a narrow interpretation.22  The authority supporting the narrow interpretation is the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sale v Haitian Centers Council Inc (‘Sale’).23  The 
case arose due to a change in the United States (‘US’) policy surrounding the return of Haitian 
refugees intercepted on the high seas.24  Between 1981 and 1992 potential Haitian refugees 
intercepted on the high seas were brought to the US for formal processing.25  However, 
following a coup against the Haitian President in 1991, the number of Haitian asylum seekers 
fleeing Haiti increased.26  In response to such increase, in 1992 the US changed its policy such 
that all Haitians intercepted on the high seas were returned to Haiti.27  The US Supreme Court 
ruled (inter alia) that the US President’s Executive Order that all aliens intercepted on the high 
seas could be repatriated was not limited by art 33.  In other words, the US Court ruled that art 
33 did not have an extraterritorial effect.   
 
A     Method of Interpreting Treaties 
 
                                                 
19 Refugee Convention art 33(1). 
20 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial 
Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol (26 January 2007) 12 [24] <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4d9486929&query=extraterritorial>.  See, Tara Magner, ‘A 
Less than “Pacific” Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia’ (2004) 16 International Journal of Refugee Law 
53, 71; Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Tillmann Löhr and Timo Tohidipur, ‘Border Controls at Sea: Requirements 
Under International Human Rights and Refugee Law’ (2009 21 International Journal of Refugee Law 256, 267-
71; Mark Pallis, ‘Obligations of States Toward Asylum Seekers at Sea: Interactions and Conflicts Between Legal 
Regimes’ (2002) 14 International Journal of Refugee Law 329, 345.  See also, the dissenting opinion in Sale v 
Haitian Centers Council Inc, 509 US 155 (1993) 188-208 (Blackmun J). 
21 The Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Defence to the Amended Statement of Claim’, Defence in CPCF v Minister 
for Immigration and Border Protection, S169/2014, 22 July 2014, 2 (f)(i)(A). 
22 See, eg, United States of America, Department of State Archive, US Observations on UNHCR Advisory Opinion 
on Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations (28 December 2007) I <http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/l/2007/112631.htm>; Sale v Haitian Centers Council Inc, 509 US 155 (1993); Atle Grahl-
Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 (Division of International Protection of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 1997) Article 33 Comments (3) <http://www.unhcr.org/3d4ab5fb9.html>; 
Fischer-Lescano, Löhr and Tohidipur, above n 20, 265; R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer 
at Prague Airport [2002] 2 AC 1, 54 [68] (Lord Hope) (‘European Roma Rights’); Ellen F D’Angelo, ‘Non-
Refoulement: The Search for a Consistent Interpretation of Article 33’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 279. 
23 509 US 155 (1993). 
24 For a more detailed background to this case see Part III. 
25 United States President Ronald Reagan, Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Executive Order 12324, 29 September 
1981; United States President George Bush, Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Executive Order 12807, 24 May 1992. 
26 Seline Trevisanut, ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement at Sea and the Effectiveness of Asylum Protection’ 
(2008) 12 Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law 205, 241-2. 
27 United States President George Bush, Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Executive Order 12807, 24 May 1992. 
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (‘VCLT’) art 31,28 which is widely 
accepted as reflecting the CIL rule for the interpretation of treaties,29 requires treaty provisions 
to ‘be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.30  
Context includes (inter alia) any agreements made between all parties when concluding the 
treaty.31  State practice applying the treaty that establishes the parties’ agreement regarding its 
interpretation and any relevant rules of international law must be taken into account together 
with the context.32  These factors are integral to a treaty’s interpretation because they form part 
of the legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation within which treaties must be 
interpreted and applied.33 
Therefore, while the starting point for interpretation is the text of art 33(1) itself, this must be 
read in light of its context and the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose.34  A construction 
that advances the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose should be adopted over a purely 
literal construction.35 
 
B     Applying the General Rule of Interpretation 
 
1   Object and Purpose 
The preamble to the Refugee Convention indicates that it aims to ensure refugees have 
fundamental rights,36 signifying a humanitarian object and purpose;37 a purpose the UNHCR 
contends is to ‘protect especially vulnerable individuals from persecution’.38 
The object and purpose of treaties of humanitarian character, like the Refugee Convention, 
carry additional weight when interpreting treaties39 because in such treaties, ‘contracting States 
                                                 
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into 
force 27 January 1980) art 31. 
29 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the 
Area (Advisory Opinion) (Seabed Dispute Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 
17, 1 February 2011) [57]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 
14, [64]-[65]; Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 103. 
30 VCLT art 31(1). 
31 Ibid art 31(2). 
32 Ibid art 31(3)(b)-(c).  See also Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 104-5. 
33 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, [53].  See also 
the discussion in Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 104, 105; James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees 
Under International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 164. 
34 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion, above n 20, 12 [25]; 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 108; Hathaway, above n 33, 74. 
35 Hathaway, above n 33, 74.  See also Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 
201 CLR 293, 307 [46] (Kirby J). 
36 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion, above n 20, 14 [29]; 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 106-7. 
37 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion, above n 20, 14 [29]; United 
States of America, Department of State Archive, above n 22, I(B); Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 106. 
38 Note, ‘UN High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to US Supreme Court Decision in Sale v Haitian Centers 
Council’ (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 1215. 
39 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 104. 




do not have any interest of their own; they merely have … a common interest’, being the 
accomplishment of higher purposes represented by such treaties’ raison d’être.40 
 
2   Ordinary Meaning of the Words 
 
The ordinary meaning of ‘return’ includes ‘to send back’ and ‘to bring, send, or put back to a 
former … place’.41  However, the majority in Sale held that ‘return’ has a narrower legal 
meaning due to insertion of ‘(“refouler”)’ following ‘return’;42 it noted that ‘return’ is not listed 
as a translation of ‘refouler’ in two respected English-French dictionaries.43  Therefore, it 
concluded that ‘refouler’ must restrict the meaning of ‘return’ and does not indicate equal 
meaning. 
The Sale majority determined the English translation of ‘refouler’ includes to ‘repulse’, ‘repel’, 
‘refuse entry’, and ‘drive back’.44  They considered this restricted the meaning of ‘return’ to a 
‘defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border rather than an act of transporting someone 
to a particular destination’.45  However, the majority adopted an even narrower interpretation, 
concluding ‘return’ only refers to a refugee already within a state’s territory but not yet resident 
there.46  Sale was cited with approval in the subsequent House of Lords’ decision, R (European 
Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport (‘European Roma Rights’).47 
However, in a strong dissent in Sale, Blackmun J condemned the majority’s reasoning, calling 
their ‘tortured reading unsupported and unnecessary’,48 and stating they led themselves astray 
by dispensing with the ordinary meaning of ‘return’ and adopting from the outset the 
assumption that ‘return’ had a narrower legal meaning.49  Blackmun J noted the language used 
is unambiguous: vulnerable refugees shall not be returned.50  It imposes no territorial limitation 
on the application of art 33(1); restricting only where refugees may be sent.51 
The Sale majority accepted that ‘refouler’ refers to rejection at the border; yet concluded 
‘return’ did not apply to refugees outside a state’s territory.  These conclusions contradict each 
other.  At a minimum, the majority ought to have concluded that ‘return’ also applied to 
refugees at the border yet outside a state’s territory. The House of Lords in European Roma 
Rights accepted this.52  Failing to accept this limited extraterritorial application indicates the 
Sale majority’s decision may have been influenced by political considerations.53 
                                                 
40 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion) 
[1951] ICJ Rep 15, 23. 
41 Merriam-Webster Online: Dictionary, Return (2014) definition of ‘return’ <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/return>. 
42 509 US 155 (1993) 180. 
43 The two dictionaries are Denis Girard, The New Cassell’s French Dictionary: French-English, English-French 
(Funk & Wagnalls, 1973) and Marguerite Marie Dubois, Modern French-English Dictionary (Librairie 
Larousse,1978); Sale, 509 US 155 (1993) 180-1. 
44 509 US 155 (1993) 181. 
45 Ibid 181-2. 
46 Ibid 182. 
47 [2005] 2 AC 1, 30-1 [18] (Lord Bingham), 54 [68] (Lord Hope). 
48 509 US 155 (1993) 191. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid 190. 
51 Ibid 193. 
52 [2005] 2 AC 1, 38 [26] (Lord Bingham). 
53 See, eg, Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford University Press, 
3rd ed, 2007) 247. 
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The majority failed to give ‘return’ its plain meaning,54 instead adopting an interpretation that 
excluded actions that actually deliver a refugee back to their persecutors, the plainest meaning 
to be attached to ‘return’.55 
Goodwin-Gill called it a decision of ‘domestic, not international law’,56 stating the majority 
takes ‘passages out of context, misquotes academic and other commentators, misrepresents the 
sense of the UNHCR Handbook, and ignores whatever might obstruct its policy decision’.57 
Contrary to the Sale majority’s conclusion, ‘return’ and ‘refouler’ do not limit territorially art 
33(1)’s application.  Article 33(1) prohibits a refugee’s return ‘in any manner whatsoever’,58 
indicating an intention ‘to prohibit any act of removal or rejection’ that places a refugee at risk 
of persecution.59  The formal description of the act, whether it be expulsion, return, or rejection, 
is immaterial.60  It covers ‘any imaginable action exposing the person concerned to the risk of 
persecution’,61 including action taken beyond a State’s territory, at entry points, and in 
international zones.62  Such actions are open from the use of ‘return’ as they constitute a form 
of ‘sending back’, which represents its literal meaning.  
When interpreting a treaty, a text construction that advances a treaty’s object and purpose 
should be adopted over a purely literal construction.63  The Sale majority acknowledged its 
narrow interpretation, which allows fleeing refugees to be gathered and returned to the country 
they sought to escape, violating art 33’s spirit.64  Yet, it did not give consideration to the fact 
that its interpretation, which allow states to reach outside their territory and refoule refugees to 
countries where they face a risk of persecution, is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
humanitarian object and purpose of the Refugee Convention,65 which seeks to provide rights 
to, and protect, refugees.66  Similarly, the United States Government’s response to UNHCR’s 
Advisory Opinion (‘US Observations’), which contends art 33(1) does not apply 
extraterritorially, acknowledges the Refugee Convention’s humanitarian character,67 but does 
not refer to this when interpreting art 33(1),68 indicating they failed to take into account the 
Refugee Convention’s object and purpose as required by the VCLT.69 
The US Government’s narrow interpretation leads to a situation where refugees who reach a 
state’s territory are protected, but those who do not are not protected.  This encourages states 
to implement interception policies to prevent refugees entering their territory and gaining 
                                                 
54 Hathaway, above n 33, 337. 
55 Ibid 337-8. 
56 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Haitian Refoulement Case: A Comment’ (1994) 6 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 103, 105 (emphasis in original). 
57 Ibid 104-5. 
58 Refugee Convention art 33(1) (emphasis added). 
59 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 112. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Fischer-Lescano, Löhr and Tohidipur, above n 20, 268. 
62 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 106-7, 111; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 53, 246. 
63 Hathaway, above n 25, 74; see also Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 
201 CLR 293, 307 [46] (Kirby J). 
64 509 US 155 (1993) 183. 
65 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion, above n 20, 14 [29]. 
66 ‘UN High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to US Supreme Court Decision’, above n 38; Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion, above n 20, 14 [29]; Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem, above n 17, 106-7. 
67 United States of America, Department of State Archive, above n 22, I(B). 
68 Ibid I(A). 
69 See VCLT art 31(1). 




protection, leaving fleeing refugees with nowhere to go.  This is incompatible with the Refugee 
Convention’s object and purpose to protect refugees. 
Any ambiguity in the terms’ literal interpretation ‘must be resolved in favour of an 
interpretation’ consistent with the treaty’s humanitarian character.70  Consequently, reading art 
33(1) in light of the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose supports art 33(1)’s 
extraterritorial application because it conforms to the Refugee Convention’s humanitarian 
character, whereas a narrow interpretation does not. 
 
3   Context 
 
The Refugee Convention’s provisions form the context within which to interpret art 33(1).71 
 
(a)   Article 33(1)’s Significance 
 
Article 33(1) is one of the few provisions to which reservations are not allowed,72 and its only 
exception is art 33(2),73 when a refugee poses a security risk to the state.74  This illustrates 
art 33(1)’s significance in the Refugee Convention,75 as it is almost a non-derogable 
obligation.76  Its non-refoulement obligation constitutes an ‘essential … component of 
international refugee protection’,77 signifying it has a fundamentally humanitarian character.78  
This supports an extraterritorial interpretation because a narrow interpretation is inconsistent 
with art 33(1)’s humanitarian character. 
 
                                                 
70 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 113. 
71 See VCLT art 31(2). 
72 Refugee Convention art 42(1).  See also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 
January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) art VII(1). 
73 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion, above n 20, 4 [11]. 
74 See Refugee Convention art 33(2). 
75 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 101. 
76 Ibid 107; Aoife Duffy, ‘Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law’ (2008) 20 
International Journal of Refugee Law 373, 374. 
77 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion, above n 20, 5 [11].  See also 
Executive Committee, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Non-Refoulement, 
Conclusion 6 (XXVIII) (12 October 1977) (a); Executive Committee, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Problems of Extradition Affecting Refugees, Conclusion 17 (XXXI) (16 October 
1980) (b); Executive Committee, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, General 
Conclusion on International Protection, Conclusion 25 (XXXIII) (20 October 1982) (b); Executive Committee, 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, General Conclusion on International Protection, 
Conclusion 65 (XLII) (11 October 1991) (c); Executive Committee, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, General Conclusion on International Protection, Conclusion 68 (XLIII) (9 October 
1991) (f); Executive Committee, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, General 
Conclusion on International Protection, Conclusion 79 (XLVII) (11 October 1996) (j); Executive Committee, 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, General Conclusion on International Protection, 
Conclusion 81 (XLVII) (17 October 1997) (i); Executive Committee, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusions on the Provision on International Protection Including Through 
Complementary Forms of Protection, Conclusion 103 (LVI) (7 October 2005) (m); GA Res 51/75, UN GAOR, 
51st sess, 82nd plen mtg, Agenda Item 105, UN Doc A/RES/51/75 (12 February 1997) [3]; GA Res 48/116, UN 
GAOR, 48th sess, 85th plen mtg, Agenda Item 113, UN Doc A/RES/58/116 (20 December 1993) [3]. 
78 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 107. 
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(b)   Article 33(2) 
 
The Sale majority and US Observations contend that art 33(2) supports a narrow interpretation 
of art 33(1).79  Article 33(2) only applies to refugees who are dangerous to the country in which 
they are in.80  It does not apply to refugees outside a state’s territory, even if they pose a 
danger.81  The Sale majority reasoned that if art 33(1) applied extraterritorially, art 33(2) 
‘would create an absurd anomaly’ where dangerous refugees intercepted on the high seas are 
entitled to protection, while those residing in a state are not.82  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume art 33(1) was limited to applying to refugees within a state because art 33(2) was 
similarly limited.83 
This argument contains fundamental flaws. Firstly, the provisions serve different purposes;84 
art 33(1) concerns protecting refugees85 whereas art 33(2) concerns protecting States from 
dangerous refugees.86  Article 33(2) permits states to return dangerous refugees within their 
territory, not seize and return refugees outside their territory which ‘expresses precisely’ the 
Refugee Convention’s objectives and concerns.87  That ‘only a refugee already in a country can 
pose a danger to the country … proves nothing’.88  Secondly, the approach is methodologically 
wrong.89 It uses ‘the exception to infer the rule’,90 failing to recognise that ‘[n]onreturn is the 
rule’ and art 33(2) is the exception.91  Due to these flaws, this argument carries no weight. 
 
(c)   Other Provisions with Territorial Requirements 
 
The Refugee Convention contains numerous provisions that expressly include territorial 
requirements, and these generally limit their scope to a state’s territory.92  This leads one to 
infer that where a provision was intended to apply only within a state’s territory the drafters 
used express words to convey that intention.93  Article 33(1) contains no such words, indicating 
that it is not territorially limited. 
 
The US Observations contend that it is unreasonable to interpret every provision as applying 
extraterritorially absent an express limitation.94  This stance is erroneous.95  The Refugee 
                                                 
79 See Sale, 509 US 155 (1993) 179-80; United States of America, Department of State Archive, above n 22, I(A). 
80 Refugee Convention art 33(2). 
81 Sale, 509 US 155 (1993) 179. 
82 Ibid 179-80. 
83 Ibid 180; United States of America, Department of State Archive, above n 22, I(A). 
84 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion, above n 20, 13 [28]; Fischer-
Lescano, Löhr and Tohidipur, above n 20, 270. 
85 Fischer-Lescano, Löhr and Tohidipur, above n 20, 270. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Sale, 509 US 155 (1993) 194 (Blackmun J). 
88 Ibid. 
89 Fischer-Lescano, Löhr and Tohidipur, above n 20, 270. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Sale, 509 US 155 (1993) 193 (Blackmun J). 
92 See Refugee Convention arts 2, 4, 15, 17(1) 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32. 
93 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion, above n 20, 13-14 [28]. 
94 United United States of America, Department of State Archive, above n 22, I(A). 
95 Hathaway, above n 33, 339. 




Convention aims to protect refugees globally.96  Consequently, it is reasonable that its 
provisions apply extraterritorially absent an express limitation because the refugees it aims to 
protect regularly have to flee persecution through extraterritorial zones. 
 
4     Factors Taken into Account together with Context 
 
(a)   Subsequent State Practice 
 
Subsequent state practice that establishes the parties’ agreement regarding a treaty’s 
interpretation must be taken into account together with a treaty’s context.97 
If all states parties act in a way that leads to an inference of common intention, that practice is 
material to a treaty’s interpretation.98  However, if only some states act a particular way 
according to their interpretation, the practice is not material.99  This is because the actions of 
only some states cannot impose obligations on other states parties, as they have not consented 
to be bound in that way.100  In addition, states’ actions can be highly self-serving and not 
reflective of a treaty’s correct interpretation.101  This is especially so when the practice observed 
is that of states, whose behaviour a provision aims to constrain to protect individuals,102 as in 
the case of art 33(1). Consequently, care must be taken when looking at state practice. 
The UNHCR contends that Conclusions of its Executive Committee (‘ExCom’), which consists 
of member states that demonstrate an interest in solving refugee problems,103 express state 
practice.104  While non-binding, these Conclusions represent agreements reached by member 
states and are relevant to the interpretation of refugee issues.105 
Some ExCom Conclusions refer to non-refoulement’s importance irrespective of whether a 
refugee is within a state’s territory.106  Some international refugee and human rights 
instruments also support non-refoulement’s extraterritorial application, as they do not 
territorially restrict non-refoulement obligations.107  However, the US Observations identify 
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that ExCom Conclusions and other international instruments do not represent state practice 
establishing the parties’ agreement regarding the Refugee Convention’s interpretation.108  At 
the time of writing, 94 states make up ExCom, and there were as few as 31 when some of the 
Conclusions cited were made;109 considerably less than the 147 states parties.110  With respect 
to the international instruments, some are only regional instruments,111 meaning they reflect 
only some states’ agreement; nor are their non-refoulement obligations identical to art 33(1).112  
Therefore, these Conclusions and instruments carry little weight in interpreting the Refugee 
Convention.113  
A significant instrument representing subsequent State practice is the Declaration of States 
Parties to the 1951 Convention and or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee 
(‘Declaration of States Parties’) adopted at the 2001 Ministerial Meeting of States Parties.114  
The States Parties agreed that the Refugee Convention ‘must be interpreted in conformity with 
international human rights treaties’.115  This is particularly significant with respect to the 
relevant rules of international law. 
 
(b)   Relevant Rules of International Law 
 
Any relevant rules of international law must be taken into account together with context when 
interpreting treaties.116 
The UNHCR’s Advisory Opinion states that ‘[i]nternational refugee law and international 
human rights law are complementary and mutually reinforcing regimes’.117  Consequently, 
Article 33(1), which embodies the Refugee Convention’s humanitarian character, should be 
interpreted consistently with international human rights law.118  The Declaration of States 
Parties supports this.119 
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Under international human rights law, obligations can extend beyond states’ territories.120 They 
do so when states exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially,121 which, as stated by the Human 
Rights Committee (‘HRC’) in General Comment No 31, occurs when states exercise effective 
control and authority over an area or persons.122  This concept of jurisdiction is established in 
decisions of the HRC,123 the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’),124 and the 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’).125 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (‘ICCPR’) art 2(1) and the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (‘ECHR’) 
art 1 require states to uphold the rights of individuals subject to, and within, their jurisdiction, 
respectively.126 
 
(i) De Facto Control 
 
With respect to the ICCPR, in Delia Saldias de Lopez v Uruguay and Lilian Celiberti de 
Casariego v Uruguay, the HRC concluded that a state could be held accountable for violations 
of the ICCPR that its agents commit on another state’s territory.127  It considered it to be 
unconscionable to interpret art 2(1) in a way that allowed states to commit violations on another 
state’s territory which they could not commit on their own.128  Consequently, it interpreted 
‘subject to its jurisdiction’ as referring not to where a violation occurred but to the relationship 
between the individual and the state.129  The ICJ confirmed this in Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, concluding that obligations arise 
where states exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially.130 
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With respect to the ECHR, the ECtHR held that a state’s jurisdiction extends extraterritorially 
where its authorities’ acts produce extraterritorial effects.131  This ‘derives from the fact of such 
control’ exercised directly or through agents.132  Therefore, extraterritorial jurisdiction occurs 
where states exercise authority or control over a territory or individuals.133  In Banković v 
Belgium, the ECtHR stressed the exceptional nature of this principle.134  While a State’s 
jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial,135 it can be exercised extraterritorially, but 
this is limited by, and subordinate to, other states’ sovereign territorial rights.136  Consequently, 
the ECtHR limited extraterritorial jurisdiction to cases where 
 
[a] State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a 
consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the 
Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by 
that Government.137 
 
In acknowledging extraterritorial jurisdiction, the ECtHR adopted the HRC’s reasoning, stating 
that the ECHR art1 ‘cannot be interpreted so as to allow a state party to perpetrate violations 
of the Convention on’ another state’s territory which it could not perpetrate on its own.138 
However, the ECtHR in Banković v Belgium commented that the ECHR only operates in 
contracting states’ territories, not globally.139  This appears to limit the ECHR’s extraterritorial 
application.140  However, subsequent decisions have not followed this. For example, in Öcalan 
v Turkey, a person’s arrest by Turkish security forces in an international zone of Nairobi 
Airport, and forced return to Turkey, meant that jurisdiction was exercised extraterritorially 
from the time they came under Turkish authority.141 
In Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, the ECtHR identified the situation in Öcalan v Turkey as one 
of three circumstances that can result in extraterritorial jurisdiction.142  This circumstance is 
the most relevant to refugee cases, with the ECtHR stating that the ‘use of force by a State’s 
agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual thereby brought under the control 
of the State’s authorities into the State’s’ jurisdiction.’143 
Banković v Belgium also raises an issue regarding the level of control required. The ECtHR 
held that NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia was not an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
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because the attack’s victims were not under the NATO States’ jurisdiction.144  Therefore, 
jurisdiction does not exist simply because a state’s actions impact upon a person.145  However, 
this is distinguishable from situations involving the refoulement of maritime refugees by 
vessels, as vessels, which have a more physical and enduring presence than planes, are used to 
intercept, and often detain, refugees.  In Öcalan v Turkey, effective physical control exerted 
over persons was sufficient to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction.146  Sufficient control also 
exists where ‘state vessels use their physical presence and strength’ in order to make other 
vessels turn back147 and where military vessels intercept refugees in international waters.148 
These decisions support the proposition that states exercise de facto jurisdiction over territory 
outside their national territory if they, or their agents, attempt to exercise effective control over 
persons within that territory.149  This requires a state to respect persons’ rights when they are 
within the state’s power or effective control, regardless of where they are,150 making the 
existence of effective authority and control decisive.151 
In addition, by choosing to have a contiguous zone and patrolling it in order to prevent 
infringements of immigration laws,152 a state exercises effective control over that zone through 
the exercise of public powers as identified by the ECtHR.153  These actions alone bring refugees 
within the contiguous zone under the state’s jurisdiction, entitling them to rights associated 
with that jurisdiction.154  
 
(ii) De Jure Control 
 
Recent decisions of international courts and bodies support the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction where states exert de jure control.  Vessels on the high seas are subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the state whose flag they fly.155  
The ECtHR has recognised a state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases concerning acts carried 
out on vessels flying the state’s flag.156  Where control is exercised over persons on board such 
a vessel, there exists de jure control.157  This is particularly relevant to the detention of refugees 
on government vessels, which fly their state flag, bringing refugees on board within the state’s 
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de jure control.  In Hirsi Jamma v Italy, the ECtHR held that during the period between 
migrants boarding an Italian ship and being transferred to Libyan authorities, they were under 
the Italian authorities’ ‘continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control’.158  
This is supported by decisions of the Committee Against Torture on violations of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984 (‘CAT’), which like the Refugee Convention contains an express non-
refoulement provision.159  Article 2(1) raises the concept of jurisdiction. In Communication No 
323/2007, the Committee held jurisdiction was applicable not only in respect of art 2(1) but in 
all the CAT’s provisions.160  In this case, Spanish authorities intercepted 369 migrants off the 
Mauritanian coast.  The Committee concluded Spain maintained control over the migrants from 
the time their vessel was rescued and throughout the subsequent identification and repatriation 
process in Mauritania.161  This indicates de jure control can be decisive in establishing 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.162  
 
(iii) Applicability to the Refugee Convention 
 
Treaties must remain dynamic.163  Their meanings change depending on the development of 
international legal and factual circumstances and concepts,164 such as the development of 
general legal principles and changes in State behaviour. 
Given the Declaration of States Parties that the Refugee Convention be interpreted in 
conformity with international human rights treaties,165 and that treaties and the principle of 
non-refoulment must remain dynamic and able to adapt to changing concepts and 
circumstances over time,166 the Refugee Convention ought to be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the increased recognition of human rights treaties’ extraterritorial 
application.167 
The HRC’s and ECtHR’s reasoning applies equally to the Refugee Convention.  Article 33(1) 
should not be interpreted so as to allow states to reach outside their territory and refoule 
refugees to territories where they face a risk of persecution as this would frustrate the Refugee 
Convention’s humanitarian object and purpose168 and is inconsistent with the concept of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.169 
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Interpreting art 33(1) in a manner consistent with this extraterritorial jurisdiction concept 
requires that it apply extraterritorially wherever states exercise jurisdiction, which occurs 
where they exercise effective control and authority over refugees.170  This concept was not 
addressed in Sale or European Roma Rights, and therefore, has not been rejected by these state 
superior courts.171  It has received support from the United Kingdom Supreme Court, which 
explained that art 33(1)’s protection attached to refugees subject to a state’s jurisdiction.172 
Additionally, interception methods exist primarily for migration control and often lack 
sufficient safeguards for identifying those needing protection,173 acting as a barrier to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ right to seek asylum,174 to which the Refugee 
Convention’s Preamble specifically refers.175  Preventing refugees from presenting a request 
for asylum may breach this right.176  Therefore, an interpretation of Article 33(1) that allows 
States to intercept and refoule refugees outside their territory is inconsistent with this 
fundamental right to request asylum. 
 
5     Territorial Scope of Art 33(1) 
 
Having discussed various influential factors, it is necessary to consider these in accordance 
with the general rule to determine the interpretation of art 33(1). 
With regards to the VCLT’s requirement to interpret a treaty in good faith,177 Lord Bingham in 
European Roma Rights stated that ‘there is no want of good faith if a state interprets a treaty 
as meaning what it says and declines to do anything significantly greater than’ what it has 
agreed to.178  Lord Bingham referred to ICJ decisions,179 which held that ‘good faith’ ‘is not 
itself a source of obligation where none’ otherwise exists.180  Such an imposition does not occur 
with respect to art 33(1)’s wide interpretation.  The wide interpretation is open on the words 
used, meaning the good faith principle is being used only to choose one interpretation over the 
other, not to impose an obligation that does not otherwise exist. 
As stated earlier, the ordinary meaning of ‘return’ means ‘to send back’,181 and the ordinary 
meaning of ‘refouler’ means to ‘repulse’, ‘repel’, ‘refuse entry’, and ‘drive back’.182  When 
these terms are read in light of their context and the Refugee Convention’s object and purpose, 
it is clear the wide interpretation applies.  The phrase ‘in any manner whatsoever’183  which 
follows ‘return’ and ‘refouler’ lends itself to an interpretation that prohibits any kind of act 
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leading to a refugee’s return, regardless of whether that act occurs inside or outside a state’s 
territory.184  It encompasses non-return and non-rejection.185 
The Refugee Convention’s fundamentally humanitarian object and purpose186 would be 
frustrated if states were allowed to avoid their obligations simply by reaching outside their 
territory.187  It would render the entire Refugee Convention irrelevant.188  Therefore, the object 
and purpose support an interpretation that art 33(1) applies extraterritorially. 
The Refugee Convention’s provisions add further weight to an interpretation that art 33(1) 
applies extraterritorially.  Article 33(1) is an essential element of international refugee 
protection.189  The protection of refugees is seriously undermined if states can determine the 
Refugee Convention’s point of application.190  The express inclusion of territorial requirements 
in the Refugee Convention’s other provisions191 supports the conclusion that one would have 
been included in art 33(1) if it were intended to have a territorial limitation.192 
The relevant rules of international law provide strong support for Article 33(1)’s extraterritorial 
application.  Scholars and subsequent state practice, evident by the Declaration of States 
Parties, indicate the Refugee Convention must be interpreted in conformity with international 
human rights treaties.193  An examination of human rights treaties reveals their application 
extends to wherever states exercise jurisdiction,194 which occurs whenever they, or their agents, 
exert effective control or authority over persons.195  
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When interpreting art 33(1) in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, 
considered in light of the totality of these factors, it is apparent that art 33(1) is clear and 
unambiguous; it establishes an obligation not to return a refugee to a country where they face 
a risk of persecution, and this ‘applies wherever a State exercises jurisdiction, including … on 
the high seas’.196 
 
C     Preparatory Work 
 
Article 32 of the VCLT allows recourse to supplementary means of interpretation to confirm 
the meaning resulting from applying the general rule (under art 31), or to re-determine its 
meaning if found to be ambiguous, obscure, manifestly absurd, or unreasonable.197 
Given the meaning of art 33(1) (resulting from applying the general rule) is unambiguous, the 
Refugee Convention’s preparatory work can only confirm art 33(1)’s meaning.198  The US 
Observations having relied heavily on the Refugee Convention’s travaux préparatoires shows 
they placed too much significance on its drafting history.199  
 
1     Travaux Préparatoires 
 
During the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee that helped draft the Refugee Convention, it was 
stated that ‘turning a refugee back to the frontier of the country where his life … is threatened 
… would be tantamount to delivering him into the hands of his persecutors’.200  The United 
States’ representative argued that regardless of whether a refugee was at the frontier or had 
crossed the border, they should not be turned back.201  These comments indicate that art 33(1) 
was not understood by the drafters to have a territorial limitation.202 
Grahl-Madsen, a leading commentator on the Refugee Convention’s drafting, provides a useful 
insight into the definition of terms and the agreement of states.  According to him, 
‘refoulement’ was used in Belgium and France to describe an informal way of removing 
persons from a territory and to describe ‘non-admittance at the frontier’, and the English 
translation of ‘refoulement’ corresponds to Anglo-American concepts of ‘exclusion’ and 
‘refusal of leave to land’.203 
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During a session of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, the Swiss delegate, recognising that 
various interpretations could be attached to the words ‘expel or return’, stated that ‘return’ 
applied only to refugees who had already entered a state, but were not yet resident there,204 and 
that ‘refouler’ could not apply to refugees who had not yet entered a state’s territory.205  The 
representatives of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden agreed with this 
interpretation.206 
From these discussions, Grahl-Madsen concluded that art 33(1) applies to refugees who are 
within a State’s territory.207  While he acknowledged that ‘refoulement’ may mean ‘non-
admittance at the frontier’, he felt it was ‘clear the prohibition against “refoulement” in Article 
33 … did not cover this aspect of … “refoulement”’.208  Grahl-Madsen noted the peculiar result 
this interpretation leads to, quoting Robinson, another scholar of this era, who stated ‘if a 
refugee has succeeded in eluding the frontier guards, he is safe; if he has not, it is his hard 
luck’.209  He noted, however, that ‘public opinion is apt to concern itself much more with the 
individual who has set foot on the nation’s territory … than with people only seen as 
shadows’.210  Therefore, according to Grahl-Madsen, the travaux préparatoires support a 
territorial limitation on art 33(1).211  
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, among others, suggest the most accurate assessment of the 
travaux préparatoires is ‘that there was no unanimity’ among states.212  Grahl-Madsen was 
misguided in drawing conclusions based on statements of several delegates, as they did not 
represent a consensus among those present.213  In addition, the Swiss and Dutch 
representatives’ comments related to their concern about art 33(1) requiring states to admit 
refugees in mass influx situations;214 they never addressed art 33(1)’s extraterritorial 
application separate of this issue.215 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem also note there are ‘significant shortcomings’ to relying on the 
travaux préparatoires of ‘treaties negotiated at a time and in circumstances far distant from the 
point at which the question of interpretation and application arises’.216  Interpretations of 
treaties must remain dynamic and be able to adapt to changing concepts and circumstances 
over time,217 as must the principle of non-refoulement, which must be construed in light of the 
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concept of asylum.218  Consequently, the Refugee Convention’s travaux préparatoires must be 
approached with care, as the world as it existed in 1951 is vastly different to the present day.219 
This leads one to conclude that recourse to the Refugee Convention’s preparatory work cannot 
confirm art 33(1)’s general rule interpretation. However, this failure to confirm the meaning 
does not affect the interpretation’s validity, which is clear and unambiguous.220 
 
D     Summing Up: Extraterritorial Application of Art 31(1) 
 
The above analysis supports an interpretation that art 33(1) applies extraterritorially in all areas 
outside a refugee’s country of origin.221  The decisive factor is not a refugee’s location, but 
whether the refugee is under the relevant state’s jurisdiction,222 which is exercised wherever a 
state exercises effective control or authority over persons.223 
 
III     CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUS  
OF NON-REFOULEMENT  
 
Many Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Southeast Asian states are not States Parties to the 
Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol,224 making it necessary to address whether non-
refoulement has developed into a CIL rule encompassing art 33(1).  If it has, it binds all 
states.225  
The majority of scholars and bodies agree that non-refoulement has gained CIL status,226 and 
some specifically argue this encompasses art 33(1).227  However, Hathaway, whose expertise 
in international refugee law is highly regarded, maintains there is insufficient evidence to 
justify this claim,228 arguing the standard of state practice and opinio juris are not yet met.229  
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There are two strands of non-refoulement: persecution, which prohibits a refugee’s return to 
territories where he or she faces a risk of persecution,230 such as is in art 33(1);231 and torture, 
which prohibits a person’s return to territories where he or she faces a risk of torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment, or other violations of fundamental human rights,232 such as the CAT’s 
prohibition against torture.233  This article addresses the persecution strand’s CIL status.   
 
A     Treaties Crystallising into Custom 
 
In international refugee law, State practice relevant to the determination of CIL is principally 
derived from treaties,234 which acts as a foundation for the development of CIL.235  In North 
Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Denmark) (Judgment) (‘North Sea Continental Shelf’), the 
ICJ identified three elements material to determining whether a treaty rule has crystallised into 
a CIL rule.236  Firstly, the provision must be of a fundamentally norm-creating character.237  
Secondly, a very widespread and representative participation in the treaty might ‘suffice of 
itself’.238  Thirdly, State practice in conformity with the provision should have been both 
extensive and virtually uniform, and should indicate a general recognition of a rule of law.239  
This third element in fact expresses the two elements required to show the development of CIL 
independently of a treaty:240 consistent state practice and opinio juris.241 
 
B     Relevance of Torture Instruments 
 
Non-refoulement’s torture strand is generally accepted as being embedded in CIL.242  Due to 
this and the considerable structural similarities between, and reasoning behind, the two non-
refoulement strands, an examination of non-refoulement to torture provisions assists in 
addressing the norm-creating character of non-refoulement to persecution.   
A comparison of each strand’s most well-known provision illustrates their similarities. The 
CAT art 3(1) prohibits a person’s return if he or she is likely to be tortured.243  The Refugee 
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Convention art 33(1) prohibits a refugee’s return if their life or freedom would be threatened 
for a convention reason.244  Both prohibit a certain class of persons’ return to a certain class of 
threat. 
Prohibition to torture instruments usually apply to ‘any persons’245 whereas prohibition to 
persecution instruments are often limited to refugees.246  However, this difference is not 
material because ‘any persons’ encompasses refugees, meaning both strands can be said to 
prohibit the return of refugees to the relevant risk.  This means the only material difference 
these two prohibition strands is what a person cannot be returned to, being persecution versus 
torture.  The two strands’ similarities are highlighted by numerous international instruments 
which do not differentiate between the two, referring only to ‘non-refoulement’.247  Due to 
these similarities, instruments concerning non-refoulement to torture can evidence the norm-
creating character of non-refoulement to persecution.  
The same cannot be said for the second and third elements identified in North Sea Continental 
Shelf.  The two strands protect refugees from different things, persecution versus torture.  This 
means that general non-refoulement, and non-refoulement to torture, cannot form the basis 
upon which a common opinio juris is formed, or state practice observed,248 with respect to non-
refoulement to persecution.  Consequently, in relation to the third element, it is necessary to 
consider evidence specific to non-refoulement to persecution. In relation to the second element, 
if widespread and representative participation is to ‘suffice of itself’ to establish a CIL rule,249 
then the ‘participation’ acts to replace state practice and opinio juris.  Therefore, only 
‘participation’ that could otherwise contribute to state practice and opinio juris should be taken 
into account, being ‘participation’ in instruments containing non-refoulement to persecution 
provisions. 
 
C     Fundamentally Norm-Creating Character 
 
The first element is that the provision must ‘be of a fundamentally norm-creating character 
such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law’.250 
Non-refoulement to persecution is found in binding international instruments other than the 
Refugee Convention, including the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
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Problems in Africa 1969251 and the American Convention on Human Rights 1969.252  It also is 
found in non-binding instruments, including the Bangkok Principles on Status and Treatment 
of Refugees 2001253 and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum 1967,254 which the General 
Assembly adopted unanimously.255  These binding and non-binding instruments affirm non-
refoulement to persecution’s normative character.256 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, and Goodwin-Gill suggest the expression of non-refoulement in 
the CAT art 3(1) is of a norm-creating character, and not a mere contractual obligation.257  Their 
reasoning is supported by interpretations of the prohibition on torture provisions of the 
ECHR,258 the ICCPR,259 and the African Charter of Human Rights 1981,260 by the ECtHR,261 
the HRC,262 and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,263 respectively, 
which read in non-refoulement components because to not do so would be contrary to the 
relevant provisions.264  These interpretations further confirm non-refoulement’s ‘normative and 
fundamental character’, particularly as the relevant articles make no reference to a prohibition 
on where a person can be sent.265 
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Non-refoulement is referred to in non-binding international instruments. Its importance is 
affirmed by the Council of Europe in Recommendation No R (84) 1266 and by Central American 
States in the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 1984.267 
Non-refoulement’s fundamental character has been expressed in several of ExCom’s non-
binding Conclusions.268  These have referred to non-refoulement’s general acceptance by 
states.269 
The totality of this evidence supports the conclusion that non-refoulement, encompassing the 
persecution strand, is of a fundamentally norm-creating character.270 
In North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ held that the relevant provision was not of a 
fundamentally norm-creating character.271  One factor contributing to this was that there were 
‘very considerable … unresolved controversies as to the’ rule’s exact meaning and scope which 
raised doubts as to its fundamentally norm-creating character.272  While there is no controversy 
surrounding non-refoulement to persecution’s general meaning, the discussion on art 33(1) in 
Part II indicates there is some controversy surrounding its extraterritorial application.273  
However, Part II indicates there is substantial scholarly support for art 33(1)’s extraterritorial 
application.274  Therefore, while some states disagree with this interpretation,275 the strength of 
their argument is not considerable enough to raise doubts about non-refoulement to 
persecution’s fundamentally norm-creating character. 
 
D     Widespread and Representative Participation 
 
The second element suggests that a very widespread and representative participation in a treaty 
may ‘suffice of itself’ to establish a CIL rule if it includes the participation of states whose 
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interests are specifically affected.276  Subsequent ICJ decisions, which did not address state 
practice or opinio juris when addressing the CIL status of parts of the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, support this.277  These Geneva Conventions278 are generally considered to reflect CIL 
due to their widespread participation.279  Currently, 186 of 195 states280 have ratified or acceded 
to these treaties.281 
An examination of major international treaties reveals 151 states have ratified or acceded to at 
least one treaty containing a non-refoulement to persecution provision.282  This is roughly 23 
per cent less participants than to the Geneva Conventions, which is significant enough to raise 
doubts that state participation is widespread and representative enough on its own to justify 
concluding a CIL rule exists.283 
 
E     State Practice and Opinio Juris 
 
The final element is that state practice must be both extensive and virtually uniform, and must 
show a rule’s existence.284  This latter factor refers to opinio juris.  This is shown by a belief 
held by states that the practice is obligatory due to a binding rule’s existence.285  
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1     Practice of States Parties versus Non-States Parties  
 
In North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ held that evidence of opinio juris could not be derived 
from the practice of states in simply complying with their treaty obligations, as an inference 
could not be drawn from this ‘that they believe themselves to be applying a mandatory rule of’ 
CIL;286 it should be derived from practice by states who are not parties to the relevant treaty.287  
However, it is unlikely the ICJ was referring to near universally accepted treaties.288  North Sea 
Continental Shelf concerned a treaty that was ratified by very few states.289  With near 
universally accepted treaties, practically all potential participants are States Parties, leaving 
little evidence available to demonstrate that non-States Parties behave in accordance with a 
rule.290  Nor is the practice of the relatively small number of non-State Parties indicative of a 
general perception among states of a rule’s existence.291  Therefore, where participation in a 
treaty is very widespread, the practice of non-States Parties is not necessary, or readily 
ascertainable for that matter, and the practice of States Parties carry probative weight, even 
where simply complying with treaty obligations.292 
When it is shown that States Parties act in a particular way because they are required not only 
by their treaty obligation but also by a CIL rule, that carries greater probative weight as opinio 
juris of the rule’s existence293 (for example, where statements supporting a CIL rule’s existence 
accompany States Parties’ practice).294 
Although 151 States bound by a treaty containing a non-refoulement to persecution provision 
does not represent universal acceptance, it does represent a significant portion of states.  
Therefore, while there still is a reasonable number of non-States Parties that can evidence state 
practice and opinio juris, the practices of States Parties carry probative weight in establishing 
non-refoulement to persecution’s CIL status. 
 
2     State Inaction 
 
Inaction can evidence state practice of prohibitory rules.295  Non-refoulement to persecution 
involves such a prohibition.  However, inaction does not necessarily indicate the existence of 
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opinio juris.296  While state practice supporting non-refoulement to persecution can be implied 
by state inaction in not refouling refugees, it is difficult to show this inaction occurs due to 
states’ beliefs in the rule’s existence.  
 
3     Positive Practice 
 
Positive actions evidencing state practice and opinio juris include declarations, the passing of 
laws, and responses to occurrences of refoulement or prima facie refoulement. 
The volume of evidence that can be adduced to show extensive and virtually uniform state 
practice is too great to address for the purpose of this article.  This article relies predominantly 
on the work of Goodwin-Gill and McAdam,297 and Lauterpacht and Bethlehem,298 who have 
addressed state practice and opinio juris in detail and concluded it justifies a finding that non-
refoulement to persecution, encompassing art 33(1), has become CIL. 
As Hathaway maintains the standard of state practice and opinio juris are not yet met,299 some 
of the issues raised by him are addressed. 
 
(a)     Acceptance in International and Domestic Law 
 
The widespread and representative participation of states in treaties containing non-
refoulement to persecution provisions,300 as well as the wide recognition of non-refoulement to 
persecution in other non-binding instruments,301 evidence state practice and opinio juris 
supporting non-refoulement to persecution’s existence under CIL.302 
Evidence of opinio juris can include domestic actions such as adopting legislation.303  
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem have identified some 80 states that have enacted specific non-
refoulement provisions or incorporated the Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol into 
domestic law.304  This occurs automatically for some of these states;305 however, many have 
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taken separate legislative action,306 including two non-States Parties, Lebanon and Iraq.307  This 
domestic legislation further evidences state practice and opinio juris supporting non-
refoulement to persecution’s CIL status.308  
 
(b)     Mere Statements/Declarations 
 
Hathaway contends simple declarations are not sufficient to create CIL and a large 
representative group of states must solidify their commitment to a rule through actions.309  This 
is supported by the ICJ, which held that mere declarations of a rule’s existence are not sufficient 
for it to become CIL.310  However, declarations cannot be ignored.311  State practice must be 
appraised in light of instances where states have expressed their recognition of a CIL rule.312  
Therefore, statements will carry probative weight when they accompany state practice. 
Some suggest that statements can evidence CIL in other circumstances.313  More recent ICJ 
decisions recognise the normative value of General Assembly resolutions, stating they may act 
as evidence that go toward establishing the emergence of a CIL rule or an opinio juris.314  Given 
it is state practice that must occur in a way that shows opinio juris,315 this is likely an 
acknowledgement by the ICJ that things less than physical actions can be adequate state 
practice.  So while mere statements cannot create norms, they can show a norm’s existence or 
emergence. Where they do, the weight attached to them is reduced where the state has not acted 
upon them and no reasonable explanation exists for this failure.316 
An analogy can be made from the ICJ’s decision in Nuclear Tests, which recognised that 
unilateral declarations create legal obligations when the declaring state intends to become 
bound by its declaration.317  Given declarations can bind states, they should also be able to 
evidence state practice and opinio juris in respect of the declaring State.  Where a declaration 
is made in a way that indicates a state believes it is bound by a CIL rule, then this should have 
that effect and evidence state practice and opinio juris,318 assisting in the emergence of CIL.  
This is especially applicable to prohibitory rules, such as non-refoulement, due to the difficulty 
in showing opinio juris accompanies inaction, placing increased reliance on statements to 
indicate opinio juris. 
Several CIL scholars argue that the importance of state practice in establishing CIL has 
reduced.  Cheng, examining the CIL status of two General Assembly Resolutions on outer 
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space, contends that CIL can develop instantly.319  Cheng argues that state practice is only 
relied on because it evidences a rule’s contents and the opinio juris of states.320  All that is 
required is that opinio juris be clearly established, making it the material element.321  This 
suggests that state practice may not play as significant a role as implied in North Sea 
Continental Shelf.  Lepard supports this, contending that state practice’s primary function is to 
evidence opino juris.322  This is consistent with the latter part of the ICJ’s reasoning in North 
Sea Continental Shelf, that state practice must occur in a way that indicates opinio juris.323  
Baxter adopts a similar view in the context of treaties evidencing CIL, stating that ‘firm 
statements by [a] State of what it considers to be the rule is far better evidence of its position 
than what can be pieced together from the actions of that country at different times in a variety 
of contexts’.324  Therefore, whether state practice takes the form of actions or statements is not 
significant; it just needs to clearly indicate the existence of a common opinio juris among states. 
ExCom Conclusions carry weight in this area as they reflect the opinion of states whose 
interests are specifically affected by refugee issues.325  Many Conclusions have reiterated the 
importance of non-refoulement in the Refugee Convention,326 and Conclusion 6 commented on 
the general acceptance by states of the principle of non-refoulement,327 indicating ExCom 
States believe non-refoulement to persecution is embedded in CIL. 
The Declaration of States Parties, which was endorsed by the General Assembly, 
acknowledged the principle of non-refoulement was embedded in CIL.328  The 126 States 
Parties present329 adopted it unanimously.330  This is strong evidence of these states’ opinio 
juris, supporting non-refoulement to persecution’s CIL status. 
Over the years numerous states’ representatives have recognised non-refoulment to 
persecution’s CIL status.  For example, in 1997, Denmark regarded art 33(1)’s non-refoulement 
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provision as being embedded in CIL.331  In 2001, the Belgium representative, speaking on 
behalf of the European Union and 13 other European States, noted in relation to the Refugee 
Convention that non-refoulement had long been part of CIL.332  This is strong evidence of these 
states’ opinio juris. 
 
(c)     Support of Non-States Parties 
 
Hathaway cites in support of his argument, that many Asian and Near East States have routinely 
refused to be formally bound by non-refoulement.333  What Hathaway does not recognise is 
that a state’s refusal to be bound by a treaty such as the Refugee Convention does not indicate 
their unwillingness to be bound by non-refoulement per se.  They may simply object to other 
provisions, some of which provide rights to refugees334 such as protection from discrimination 
and protection from penalisation for unlawful entry.335  Malaysia and Indonesia are examples 
of this.  Refugees in these countries have very few rights and sometimes face penalties for their 
‘irregular’ arrival.336  However, both States cooperate with the UNHCR by receiving asylum 
seekers and allowing the UNHCR to process them.337  Their actions indicate they do not engage 
in the refoulement of refugees and respect the principle of non-refoulement to persecution,338 
supporting a belief they are bound by a CIL rule.339  Thailand has expressed that ‘in line with 
the principle of non-refoulement, asylum countries were under an obligation to’ admit 
refugees,340 suggesting Thailand believes non-States Parties are bound by non-refoulement.341  
In addition, the actions of Syria and Jordan, which both let in hundreds of thousands of Iraqi 
refugees during and after the Iraq war,342 supports non-refoulement to persecution’s existence 
in CIL. 
 
(d)     Specific Occurrences of Refoulement 
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Hathaway’s main contention, that the standard of state practice is not yet met,343 is supported 
by many occurrences of refoulement,344 which suggests states have not near-universally 
accepted non-refoulement to persecution.345  It is not possible to address each of these 
occurrences; however, three will be addressed to indicate Hathaway’s arguments are not 
tenable: (a) Tanzania’s border closures and expulsion of Rwandan and Burundian refugees 
during the Great Lakes emergency;346 (b) Macedonia’s border closure to Albanian refugees 
fleeing Kosovo following NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia;347 and (c) the US’s interception of 
Haitian refugees.348 
Hathaway fails to recognise that occurrences of refoulement do not necessarily indicate a lack 
of belief in the rule’s existence.  State practice does not have to conform perfectly to the rule.349  
It is sufficient if practice is generally consistent with the rule.350  Inconsistent practices ‘should 
generally be treated as breaches of the rule’.351  Where a state acts prima facie inconsistently 
with the rule, but tries to defend its conduct as not breaching or being an exception to the rule, 
then regardless of whether such actions are correct or not, this confirms rather than weakens 
the rule.352  This is because a state’s attempt to explain its conduct indicates that the state 
believes a binding rule exists.353  Therefore, it is sufficient if there is a consistent and settled 
practice supporting the rule’s existence.354 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue that occurrences of refoulement by states have been 
accompanied by arguments that no obligation attached to the persons returned, on grounds of 
their refugee status or due to exceptions to non-refoulement, particularly in regard to threats to 
national security.355 
On other occasions, justification is made on the basis of mass influxes of refugees being an 
exception to non-refoulement.  Mass influxes can place significant strain upon a host state,356 
particularly ‘fragile and poor’ states.357  Some scholars consider mass influxes to be an 
exception to art 33(1),358 including Hathaway, who has stated ‘non-refoulement does not bind 
a state faced with a mass influx of refugees insofar as the arrival of refugees truly threatens its 
ability to protect its most basic national interests’.359  
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(i)     Tanzanian Border Closure to Rwandan and Burundian Refugees 
 
In 1994, during the Great Lakes emergency, thousands of Rwandans fled to Tanzania to escape 
the Rwandan genocide.360  As the crisis entered its post-emergency phase, the relief assistance 
provided to Tanzania declined.361  In mid-1995, Tanzania closed its borders to thousands of 
Rwandan and Burundian refugees.362  In 1996, it expelled 250,000 Rwandan refugees.363  
While these are prima facie breaches of non-refoulement, a closer examination is required. 
The huge numbers of refugees stretched Tanzania’s resources and caused security concerns.364  
Without adequate support provided from the international community, Tanzania was unable to 
cope with the burden of so many refugees to protect, invoking security and mass influx as 
reasons for the refoulement, indicating Tanzania’s belief this was an exception to, and not a 
breach of, the rule.365 
Consistent with this, on other occasions Tanzania claimed those returned were not refugees but 
illegal aliens subject to expulsion.366  On one occasion where Burundian refugees were 
refouled, Tanzania stated that this had occurred accidentally, due to a misunderstanding of 
national policy.367  
These justifications confirm rather than weaken the rule.368 
 
(ii) Macedonia’s Border Closure to Albanians 
 
In the lead-up to the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s, Macedonia stated it would close its borders 
if a mass influx occurred.369 NATO commenced bombing Kosovo on 24 March 1999 following 
which thousands of Albanian refugees fled to Macedonia.370  Macedonia accepted these 
refugees until 31 March 1999.371  However, when a further 25,000 arrived on 1 April 1999, 
only 3,000 were permitted to enter.372  The remainder were let in on 4 April 1999 when an 
agreement was reached to reopen the borders.373 
Macedonia’s decision to close its border was due to its political, economic and ethnic situation. 
Macedonia had economic concerns,374 and there were fears it did not have the resources to 
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accept more refugees375 as its health system was already stretched prior to the crisis and the 
number of refugees who entered and sought to enter Macedonia, relative to its small population, 
was huge.376  Albanians were the largest ethnic minority in Macedonia.377  Macedonia feared 
that an influx of Albanians would upset its ethnic balance, destabilising its fragile political 
situation and radicalising the already restless Albanian minority.378 
Macedonia’s warning it would close its borders constituted a pre-emption that a mass influx of 
Albanian refugees posed a national security threat.379  Macedonia feared the collective threat a 
mass influx of Albanian refugees posed, constituted a substantial risk to its political security.380  
Macedonia’s later actions support this.  After opening its borders, Macedonia closed them again 
for a short period to ensure a balance between the number of Albanians entering and leaving.381  
That Macedonia sought to defend its conduct as not breaching non-refoulement to persecution, 
rather than arguing the rule does not exist,382 strengthens the rule’s existence. 
 
(iii) The US’s Interception of Haitians 
 
In 1981, US President Reagan issued an Executive Order to intercept in international waters, 
and return, people fleeing Haiti, except for legitimate refugees.383  The same Order required 
the observance of ‘international obligations concerning those who genuinely feared 
persecution’.384  This indicates the US believed it was bound not to return refugees intercepted 
on the high seas.385  This policy continued for over a decade.386  Following the coup against 
the Haitian President in 1991, the number of asylum seekers fleeing Haiti increased.387  In 
1992, President Bush issued a new Executive Order for the interception and return of all 
Haitians attempting to enter the US by the high seas.388  The US justified its actions by arguing 
non-refoulement to persecution did not apply extraterritorially.389  In 1989, it had commented 
that while its practice was to not return people likely to be persecuted, this did not reflect a 
principle of CIL or apply to refugees not yet within a state’s territory.390 
These actions and comments starkly contradict the US’s practice over the previous eight 
years.391  In 1982, the US Attorney General wrote to the UNHCR stating the United States was 
firmly committed to non-refoulement and that the US had taken steps to ensure persons 
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intercepted at sea who had a ‘colourable claim of asylum’ were brought to the US for formal 
application processing to ensure nobody with a fear of persecution was mistakenly returned to 
Haiti.392  In 1987, the US affirmed the importance of non-refoulement to persecution.393  
According to Goodwin-Gill, non-refoulement to persecution has existed as a CIL rule since 
before 1992 when the US changed its policy and started intercepting and returning Haitian 
refugees.394  Therefore, the US’s actions breach non-refoulement to persecution, as opposed 
acting as evidence against its existence.395 
That the US employed a policy not to return Haitians with ‘colourable’ refugee claims for over 
a decade indicates it believed there was a rule prohibiting the refoulement of refugees on the 
high seas.396  This led Goodwin-Gill to conclude the 1989 comment was just a self-serving 
comment drafted with the future Haitian interception programme in mind that came too late to 
excuse the US from liability.397  Therefore, the policy to return Haitian refugees should not be 
considered state practice contrary to the CIL status of non-refoulement to persecution, or its 
extraterritoriality, as it was purely politically motivated and contrary to the US’s previous 
position which appeared to support non-refoulement’s CIL status. 
 
4     Summary of State Practice and Opinio Juris 
 
While state inaction represents actual practice of non-refoulement, breaches are what stand out.  
While Hathaway argues breaches are too numerous,398 it is clear from the above discussion that 
the standard of state practice and opinio juris are, or can be satisfied.  Contrary to Hathaway’s 
contentions, mere statements can demonstrate a CIL rule,399 and it is sufficient if there is a 
generally consistent practice among states.400 
The widespread state participation in international instruments containing a non-refoulement 
to persecution provision401 or recognition of non-refoulement to persecution,402 and the 
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adoption into domestic law of non-refoulement provisions,403 evidence state practice occurring 
in such a way as to show opinio juris of non-refoulement to persecution’s existence in CIL. 
ExCom’s Conclusions,404 individual states’ comments,405 non-States Parties’ practices,406 and 
especially the Declaration of States Parties confirming non-refoulement to persecution’s CIL 
status,407 all demonstrate the rule’s existence. 
An examination of the Tanzanian border closure, the Macedonian border closure, and the US 
Haitian policy, which are some of the instances Hathaway cites to support his contention that 
the standard is not met,408 indicate the opposite. These occurrences of refoulement indicate 
violating states do not challenge non-refoulement to persecution’s existence;409 they argue their 
conduct does not breach, or is an exception to, non-refoulement.  This is supported by the 
UNHCR’s Advisory Opinion which states that in its experience, states have overwhelmingly 
indicated their acceptance that non-refoulement has become a CIL rule, demonstrated by them 
providing explanations and justifications to the UNHCR in situations of actual refoulement.410  
These actions indicate states believe the rule exists,411 thereby supporting its existence.412 
Taken together, the evidence indicates generally consistent State practice and opinio juris 
supporting non-refoulement to persecution’s CIL status. 
 
F     Summing Up: Customary International Law Status  
of Non-Refoulement  
 
The inclusion of non-refoulement to persecution provisions in many binding and non-binding 
international instruments affirms the principle’s norm-creating character,413 supporting its 
existence in CIL.414  An examination of state practice also reveals consistent state practice and 
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opinio juris.  Therefore, the two necessary elements identified in North Sea Continental Shelf 
are met, indicating non-refoulement to persecution has become embedded in CIL.  In a refugee 
context, this encompasses art 33(1) and applies extraterritorially.415 
 
IV     LEGALITY OF AUSTRALIA’S POLICY 
 
The conclusions reached in Parts II and III indicate that Australia’s obligation not to refoule 
refugees can apply to refugees outside Australia’s territory.  This raises the question of whether 
Australia’s actions enforcing its turn-back policy breach art 33(1) or its CIL counterpart.  In 
order to consider this question, it is necessary to firstly understand how refugee status and non-
refoulement apply in practice. 
 
A     Refugee Status 
 
Protection from refoulement is granted to any person who meets the Refugee Convention art 1 
definition of ‘refugee’.416  A person meets this definition by virtue of his or her 
circumstances.417  As soon as a person satisfies art 1’s criteria, he or she is a refugee.418  
Therefore, non-refoulement applies independently of any formal refugee status 
determination;419 which is purely declaratory in nature.420 
The corollary of this is that if Australia refoules a refugee without adequately assessing his or 
her refugee status, Australia cannot claim lack of knowledge or lack of formal refugee status 
as a defence; it will have breached its obligations.  
 
B     Status Determination Process 
 
The Refugee Convention does not stipulate a procedure for refugee status determinations.  
However, its object and purpose support the need for case-by-case assessments of refugee 
status.421  Where a state fails to properly identify and protect refugees, it breaches its non-
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refoulement obligations.422  This means asylum claims must be examined on their substantive 
merits423 on an individual basis424 if asylum seekers are to be returned without breaching 
international law.425 
As such, Australia can only avoid breaching its obligations by ensuring that all asylum seekers 
who may be protected from refoulement have their refugee status properly determined.426 
  
C     What is Prohibited 
 
The prohibition in art 33(1) and its CIL counterpart on returning refugees to ‘territories’427 
indicates that the formal status of where refugees may not be refouled to is irrelevant, and is 
not limited to the refugees’ country of origin.428  Return to any territory where they risk being 
persecuted is prohibited.429 
Typically, refoulement involves refugees being directly returned to a territory where they face 
a risk of persecution. However, indirect refoulement is also prohibited.430  This occurs in two 
ways.  It occurs where a state simply turns around a boat, leaving refugees with no option but 
to return on their own accord to a territory where they face a risk of persecution.431  It also 
occurs where a state returns refugees to another state; or turns around a boat, leaving refugees 
with no option but to return on their own accord to another state and the other state then returns 
the refugees to a territory where they face a risk of persecution.432  This latter liability on the 
original refouling state exists because of art 33(1)’s prohibition on refoulement in ‘any manner 
whatsoever’.433  Therefore, while non-refoulement does not require states to grant asylum,434 it 
does require them to adopt a course of action that does not lead to refugees being returned to 
territories where they face a risk of persecution, whether directly or indirectly.435  States may 
only return refugees if there is no real chance this will occur.436 
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D     Application to Australia 
 
Non-refoulement obligations bind all of a State’s organs437 as well as any entity acting on its 
behalf.438  Therefore, BPC which carries out Australia’s ‘turn-back’ policy439 is bound by 
Australia’s non-refoulement obligation.440  Whether Australia has breached this obligation is 
discussed with respect to two incidents detailed below. 
 
1     Escorted Back to Indonesia 
 
The first incident concerned 18 asylum seekers intercepted near Ashmore Reef on 1 May 2014, 
and the three-day escort of their boat closer to Indonesia by BPC.441  On 4 May, three additional 
asylum seekers were placed on the boat, before BPC directed them towards Indonesian territory 
and then left.442 
There is little doubt that art 33(1) governs these acts.  Part II identified that art 33(1) applies 
extraterritorially wherever states exercise jurisdiction,443 which occurs where states exercise 
effective control or authority over persons.444  This includes when states detain people on a 
vessel flying their state flag,445 as occurred here in respect of the three asylum seekers 
transferred to the boat.  State vessels intercepting boats, including engaging in turning boats 
around and transferring refugees, also meet the control threshold.446  This boat’s escort back to 
Indonesia involves greater control than simply turning a boat around as the escorting BPC 
vessel determined where the asylum boat went.  Therefore, BPC arguably exercised effective 
authority over the boat and the asylum seekers on board it, extending art 33(1)’s operation onto 
them. 
Obligations can also arise irrespective of physical control if the interception occurred in the 
contiguous zone.447  Australia’s choice to have a contiguous zone and to patrol it in order to 
prevent the infringement of its immigration laws brings the whole zone within Australia’s 
jurisdiction for these purposes.448  Consequently, any refugee who reaches Australia’s 
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contiguous zone is afforded the same protection as one who reaches its territorial sea.  It is 
unclear whether this boat reached Australia’s contiguous zone.  However, following the turn-
back policy, the interception was likely to have occurred once the boat reached Australia’s 
contiguous zone.449  Therefore, art 33(1) would arguably apply to the asylum seekers on this 
boat who are refugees.  No reports suggest these asylum seekers had their refugee status 
determined.  However, as refugee status determinations are purely declaratory in nature,450 if 
any were refugees, Australia’s failure to identify and protect them would arguably breach art 
33(1).451 
A Parliament of Australia research paper indicates that under the Howard Government’s 
Pacific Solution (which is similar to the current turn-back policy), between September 2001 
and February 2008, 70 per cent of asylum seekers arriving by boat were found to be refugees.452  
During 2009 and 2010 under the Rudd Government, 73 per cent were found to be refugees.453  
Therefore, there is a strong possibility that boats containing asylum seekers which are 
intercepted by Australian authorities would contain some refugees.  This means there is a strong 
possibility Australia refouled refugees in this case. 
The Commonwealth Government might contend that by returning refugees to Indonesia, they 
are not being returned to a territory where they face a risk of persecution.  However, Australia 
cannot guarantee that the refugees will not be refouled by Indonesia because it is simply 
escorting them to the edge of Indonesia’s territory.  It has no agreement in place with Indonesia 
with respect to refugees returned in this manner to ensure they are protected. Consequently, the 
return of these asylum seekers would arguably breach art 33(1). 
As the CIL version of non-refoulement to persecution encompasses art 33(1),454 CIL would 
also arguably be breached. 
 
2     Detention and Transfer of Sri Lankans 
 
The second case involves the interception and detention by BPC of Sri Lankan asylum seekers 
of Sinhalese and Tamil ethnicities west of Cocos Islands in late June 2014, before their transfer 
to Sri Lankan authorities on 6 July.455  These asylum seekers were screened to identify if any 
ought to be referred to a further determination process.456  However, only three basic questions 
were asked: ‘What are your reasons for coming to Australia?  Do you have any other reasons 
for coming to Australia? Would you like to add anything else?’457  If refugees did not state they 
sought asylum because they feared persecution, they were screened out and returned.458 
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As discussed above, the detention of asylum seekers on an Australian vessel, as is the case 
here, extends the operation of art 33(1) onto those detained. 
This incident differs from the previous one because brief screening occurred here. Although it 
is up to states to determine the process they use to assess refugee status,459 that does not mean 
states can utilise inadequate procedures.  If a refugee is screened out, arguably Australia will 
have breached its non-refoulement obligations.460 
Given the alleged slaughter of Tamils by Sri Lanka’s military toward the end of it civil war,461 
and the alleged ongoing mistreatment and torture of Tamils by Sri Lanka’s government 
agencies,462 it is likely that some of the asylum seekers were refugees.  It is doubtful that 
Australia’s screening process successfully identified these refugees as only one asylum seeker 
was identified as possibly having a claim to asylum.463  Such a small proportion contradicts 
historical rates of successful claims made by Sri Lankan asylum seekers who arrive by boat, 
which is between 80 to 90 per cent.464  Therefore, it is likely there were refugees among those 
returned.  Given they were returned to authorities of the state they sought to flee from, which 
authorities have been suspected of severely mistreating Tamils, their return probably breached 
art 33(1). 
As the CIL version of non-refoulement to persecution encompasses art 33(1),465 CIL would 
also probably be breached. 
 
V     CONCLUSION  
 
The above discussions and conclusions indicate that BPC’s actions in enforcing Australia’s 
turn-back policy may have possibly breached Australia’s international obligations imposed by 
the Refugee Convention and CIL not to refoule refugees to territories where they face a risk of 
persecution.   
The challenges associated with enforcement of Australia’s international obligations, and the 
concerns regarding the implications for Australia and those who may possibly have been 
refouled should be noted.  One of the major problems of the Refugee Convention is that it ‘lacks 
a supra-national enforcement mechanism with de facto power to compel state behaviour’.466  It 
does not provide for the possibility of individual complaints against states to be made in 
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international courts or tribunals when alleged breaches occur.467  Although it does provide that 
disputes between States can be referred to the ICJ at a disputing State’s request,468 this 
provision has never been invoked.469  Consequently, breaches of its provisions are ‘checked 
only by public opinion, national judicial interpretation, and international influence’.470  Recent 
events in Australia have shown that these can be rather influential. In July 2014, the 
Commonwealth Government transferred to Sri Lankan authorities 41 Sri Lankan nationals and 
the fate of another 153 asylum seekers who had been intercepted was unclear.471  Refugee 
advocates strongly criticised the Commonwealth Government,472 and human rights lawyers 
brought a case in the High Court on the latter asylum seekers’ behalf successfully seeking an 
interim injunction against their return,473 which generated negative publicity for the 
Commonwealth Government.474  After almost a month detained at sea, and in response to 
public pressure and the High Court case, the Commonwealth Government transferred the 
asylum seekers to the Curtin Detention Centre on Australia’s mainland.475  These asylum 
seekers are now in Nauru having their refugee status assessed.476  This indicates that public 
scrutiny of the Commonwealth Government’s actions can influence its decisions.  
The High Court case addressed whether the powers granted under the Maritime Powers Act 
2013 (Cth), which allow officers to intercept and detain people, and take them anywhere,477 
authorised officers to detain the plaintiff and take him to India.  While the plaintiff sought the 
Court’s determination whether this power was constrained by Australia’s non-refoulement 
obligations, including those imposed by the Refugee Convention and CIL,478 this question was 
not answered, as the plaintiff did not submit any facts suggesting he feared persecution in India 
or that there was any risk of direct or indirect refoulement to Sri Lanka from India.479  In making 
its decision, the High Court was restricted to interpreting the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) 
by reference to Australia’s domestic law, not international law.480 
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If Australia is to continue its turn-back policy, it must adopt a course of action that is consistent 
with non-refoulement.481  This means Australia can only turn back asylum seekers if it does 
not lead to refugees being refouled to territories where they face a risk of persecution.482  
Australia can only be sure this will not occur if they assess the refugee status of all asylum 
seekers that they intend to turn back, which must be determined by examining, on an individual 
basis,483 the substantive merits of each asylum seeker’s claim.484 
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